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Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study 
Matthew Sag  
ABSTRACT: This detailed empirical and doctrinal study of copyright trolling 
presents new data showing the astonishing rate of growth of multi-defendant 
John Doe litigation in United States district courts over the past decade. It 
also presents new evidence of the association between this form of litigation 
and allegations of infringement concerning pornographic films. Multi-
defendant John Doe lawsuits have become the most common form of copyright 
litigation in several U.S. districts, and in districts such as the Northern 
District of Illinois, copyright litigation involving pornography accounts for 
more than half of new cases. 
This Article highlights a fundamental oversight in the literature on copyright 
trolls. Paralleling discussions in patent law, scholars addressing the troll 
issue in copyright have applied status-based definitions to determine who is, 
and is not, a troll. This Article argues that the definition should be conduct-
based. Multi-defendant John Doe litigation should be considered copyright 
trolling whenever it is motivated by a desire to turn litigation into an 
independent revenue stream. Such litigation, when initiated with the aim of 
turning a profit in the courthouse as opposed to seeking compensation or 
deterring illegal activity, reflects a kind of systematic opportunism that fits 
squarely within the concept of litigation trolling. This Article shows that 
existing status-based definitions of copyright trolls do not account for what is 
now arguably the most prevalent form of trolling. 
In addition to these empirical and theoretical contributions, this Article shows 
how statutory damages and permissive joinder make multi-defendant John 
Doe litigation possible and why allegations of infringement concerning 
pornographic films are particularly well-suited to this model. 
  
 
            Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Associate Director for 
Intellectual Property of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. Thanks to Tonja Jacobi, 
Glynn Lunney, Jonathan Phillips, David Schwartz, and Spencer Waller, and the participants at 
the Internet Law Works in Progress Conference, Law and Society, and the Intellectual Property 
Scholars Conference for their comments and suggestions. Replication code in Stata12 available 
upon request. Raw data available at http://matthewsag.com/?page_id=19. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent trolls are in the news,1 and they have been high on the agenda of 
intellectual property policy makers and academics for over a decade now.2 
Those targeted by patent aggregators and patent holding companies 
accounted for nearly 38% of all patent defendants.3 Depending on your 
definition of a patent troll, the incidence of patent troll litigation may be 
increasing.4 The President has condemned patent trolls,5 and new legislation 
targets patent trolls.6 While patent trolls hog the limelight, a particular type 
of copyright troll has been taking over the dockets of several United States 
district courts, and yet copyright trolls have received comparatively little 
attention in policy and academic circles. District court judges have 
commented on how copyright litigation is changing,7 but this is the first 
systematic in-depth analysis of the data.8 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Edgar Walters, Tech Companies Fight Back Against Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/tech-companies-fight-back-against-
patent-lawsuits.html. 
 2.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-
competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. See generally Mark A. Lemley & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013). 
 3.  Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 649, 678 fig. 3 (2014) (using statistics from 2010 and 2012). 
 4.  Colleen Chien reports that patent trolls filed 29% of patent lawsuits in 2010 and 62% 
in 2012. Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLYO (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www. 
patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html. However, new research using more 
transparent data finds that, based on the total number of patent litigants, there is almost no 
difference between 2010 and 2012. See Cotropia et al., supra note 3. 
 5.  President Obama recently stated “[patent trolls] don’t actually produce anything 
themselves. They’re just trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they 
can extort some money out of them.” Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American 
Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/ 
06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 6.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The AIA included a revision to the joinder rules for 
patent litigation, which required lawsuits filed against multiple unrelated parties to be filed 
separately, a provision squarely aimed at patent trolls. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
 7.  See, e.g., In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 82 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“These actions are part of a nationwide blizzard of civil actions brought by 
purveyors of pornographic films alleging copyright infringement by individuals utilizing a 
computer protocol known as BitTorrent.”). 
 8.  The Copyright Office has never addressed the issue of copyright trolls, nor does the 
Copyright Office’s recent report on Copyright Small Claims even mention them. See generally 
MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS (2013), available at  
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf. For non-empirical 
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This empirical study of copyright trolling presents new data that reveals 
the astonishing growth of a particular kind of copyright trolling—the multi-
defendant John Doe (“MDJD”) lawsuit that alleges copyright violation 
through the file sharing software known as BitTorrent. Generally, these suits 
take the form of “Copyright Owner v. John Does 1–N” where N is a large 
number.9 MDJD suits are not just any form of copyright trolling, they are the 
dominant form. In 2013, these MDJD suits were the majority of copyright 
cases filed in 19 of the 92 federal districts.10 
Defining exactly what makes an individual or an organization a troll is 
inevitably controversial.11 The essence of trolling is that the plaintiff is more 
focused on the business of litigation than on selling a product or service or 
licensing their IP to third parties to sell a product or a service. The 
paradigmatic troll plays a numbers game in which it targets hundreds or 
thousands of defendants, seeking quick settlements priced just low enough 
that it is less expensive for the defendant to pay the troll rather than defend 
the claim. This is a familiar pattern in patent law where trolls thrive by 
opportunistically taking advantage of the uncertain scope of patent claims, 
the poor quality of patent examination, the high cost of litigation, and the 
asymmetric stakes faced by the patent assertion entities and the businesses 
they target.12 
As this Article demonstrates, a similar numbers game increasingly 
dominates copyright litigation. Of the 3817 copyright law suits filed in 2013, 
 
discussions of the MDJD phenomenon see, for example, James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on 
Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 79 (2012); Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy 
Through Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 111 MICH. L. REV. 283 (2012); Gregory S. 
Mortenson, Comment, BitTorrent Copyright Trolling: A Pragmatic Proposal for a Systemic Problem, 43 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1105 (2013); Patience Ren, Note, The Fate of BitTorrent John Does: A Civil 
Procedure Analysis of Copyright Litigation, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1343 (2013). And for more recent 
discussion, see Christopher Civil, Mass Copyright Infringement Litigation: Of Trolls, Pornography, 
Settlement and Joinder, 30 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2 (2014), available at http://jost.syr.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Volume30.pdf; Joshua A. Druckerman, Note, The Uncertifiable Swarm: Why 
Defendant Class Actions and Mass BitTorrent Copyright Litigation Don’t Mix, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 931 
(2013–2014); Evan Hoole, Note, An Uncomfortable Threesome: Permissive Party Joinder, BitTorrent, 
and Pornography, 63 EMORY L.J. 1211 (2014); Shipra Metha, Comment, Light at the End of the 
Narrow Tunnel, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH & INTELL. PROP. L. 425 (2014). 
 9.  Not all plaintiffs in such suits are trolls in the sense that this term is invoked in the 
patent literature—i.e., they are not all non-practicing entities—but the conclusion of this Article 
is that these massive MDJD suits are by and large instances of trolling. 
 10.  Alabama (S.D.); Colorado; Delaware; the District of Columbia; Florida (M.D.); Georgia 
(N.D.); Georgia (S.D.); Illinois (C.D.); Illinois (N.D.); Indiana (N.D.); Maryland; Michigan 
(E.D.); Ohio (S.D.); Pennsylvania (E.D.); Tennessee (E.D.); Tennessee (W.D.); Washington 
(W.D.); Wisconsin (E.D.); and Wisconsin (W.D.). In 2013, pornography MDJD suits accounted 
for over half of suits filed in 11 federal districts: Alabama (S.D.); the District of Columbia; Illinois 
(C.D.); Illinois (N.D.); Indiana (N.D.); Maryland; Michigan (E.D.); Pennsylvania (E.D.); 
Tennessee (E.D.); Tennessee (W.D.); and Wisconsin (E.D.). 
 11.  See generally Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2. 
 12.  See generally id. 
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over 43% were against John Does and more than three-quarters of those 
related to pornography.13 The economic viability of MDJD litigation depends 
on suing as many defendants as possible in a single action to keep costs low 
and leveraging the threat of statutory damages in order to maximize the flow 
of settlement dollars. As discussed in more detail in Part II, these suits are a 
form of copyright trolling. 
Copyright trolls may draw inspiration from their patent counterparts, but 
they are a product of two unique features of copyright law: the first is the 
incentives created by statutory damages; the second is the permissive 
approach to joinder taken by many district courts in file-sharing cases.14 The 
theory behind these MDJD lawsuits is that individuals who share the same 
movies and other copyrighted works via BitTorrent can be joined together in 
a single copyright lawsuit.15 Litigating a case all the way to trial against 
thousands of individuals in the same suit would be ridiculous and unwieldy,16 
but these suits are not filed with an actual hearing in mind. MDJD lawsuits are 
filed to take advantage of court-ordered discovery to break the veil of 
anonymity that separates IP addresses from the account information of actual 
human beings.17 They are means to compel Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”) such as Comcast and AT&T to give plaintiff copyright owners the 
names and addresses that match the IP addresses that they already have. 
After obtaining the names and addresses of account holders suspected of 
participating in a BitTorrent swarm, the plaintiff can get to work negotiating 
settlements.18 An account holder accused of infringement is almost invariably 
threatened with statutory damages and the prospect of paying the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees if he is unable to establish his innocence.19 Reports indicate 
 
 13.  Of the 1667 John Doe cases, 1267 (or 76%) related to pornography, while 400 (or 
24%) did not. 
 14.  See infra Part III.A on statutory damages and Part III.B on joinder. 
 15.  See infra Part III.B. 
 16.  Just imagine how long a scheduling conference would take. 
 17.  Parties generally may not initiate discovery prior to satisfying the meet and confer 
requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); however, this is not possible where the defendant is 
identified by his IP address and has not been served. Thus, plaintiffs in MDJD suits must apply 
for earlier discovery under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). See Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 
239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Note also that without a court-ordered subpoena, many of the ISPs, 
who qualify as “cable operators” for purposes of 47 U.S.C. § 522(5) (2012), are effectively 
prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2012) from disclosing the identities of the putative defendants. 
 18.  See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Does 1–293, No. 12 C 07869, 2014 WL 222722, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 21, 2014) (upholding defendant anonymity through discovery); Malibu Media, LLC v. 
Does 1–68, Nos. 12 cv 6675, 12 cv 6677, 2013 WL 5423872, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013) 
(“Once the identities become known to the plaintiff, the John Does are served with process. The 
defendants then either settle with the plaintiffs, default, or contest the suit.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Settlement Letter from John L. Steele, Attorney, Steele Hansmeier, PLLC (May 
16, 2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/AJohnson/110 
719_Steele_Hansmeier_Settlement_Letter.pdf (explaining statutory damages and offering to settle 
$2900). 
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that settlements are usually in the range of $2000 to $4000. That is a lot to 
pay for a movie, but only a fraction of the potential statutory damages for 
willful copyright infringement, which can be as high as $150,000 per work 
infringed.20 The $4000 figure is also evidently “a sum calculated to be just 
below the cost of a bare-bones defense.”21 This does not prove that the 
plaintiffs are simply pursuing nuisance-value settlements, but it is consistent 
with that theory. 
In addition to relying on statutory damages and permissive joinder, Part 
III of this Article shows that the majority of MDJD suits also feature an 
additional ingredient—pornography.22 Not all MDJD lawsuits relate to 
pornography, but the association with pornography is far from coincidental. 
The MDJD model works especially well for pornography because the potential 
embarrassment of being accused (accurately or not) of downloading such 
material is a great motivation to settle. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II locates MDJD suits within the 
broader context of the IP troll debate. It explains why attempts to define 
copyright trolls in terms of status—i.e., in terms of the plaintiff’s relationship 
to the underlying IP—are ultimately flawed and suggests a conduct-focused 
approach based on identifying systematic opportunism. Part II explains why 
MDJD lawsuits have all of the hallmarks of copyright trolling, and it explores 
the basic economics of MDJD litigation. It then presents empirical data 
documenting the astonishing rise of MDJD lawsuits over the past decade. Part 
III explores the role of statutory damages and permissive joinder in MDJD 
lawsuits in terms of the economic model developed in Part II. Part III also 
explains why the economics of this type of litigation are so well-suited to 
allegations of infringement concerning pornography and presents new data 
on the prevalence of pornography-related MDJD lawsuits. Part IV presents 
concrete proposals for copyright reform designed to make copyright trolling 
less attractive. This Part explains how, even in the absence of legislative 
reform, district court judges can exercise their discretion over joinder and 
early discovery to ensure that statutory damages are not excessive and to insist 
on various procedural safeguards. 
II. THE RISE OF THE COPYRIGHT TROLL 
This Part documents the rise of the copyright troll as an empirical 
phenomenon. As part of the foundation for the empirical exercise, Part II.A 
locates MDJD litigation within the broader context of the IP troll debate. It 
explains why the literature’s existing focus on examples such as Righthaven 
overlooks the most important manifestations of trolling. Part II.B explains why 
 
 20.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2013). 
 21.  Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-833-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. May 6, 2013). 
 22.  See infra Part III.C. 
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MDJD lawsuits typically should be regarded as trolling. Part II.C explores the 
basic economics of MDJD litigation. Part II.D then presents the empirical data 
on the rise of MDJD lawsuits over the past decade. 
A. COPYRIGHT TROLLS AND COPYRIGHT TROLLING 
1. Righthaven 
From 2010 to 2011, a Nevada-based company called Righthaven LLC 
followed a business model that can be summarized in three simple steps: 
(1) recruit content owners, principally newspapers; (2) identify plausible 
cases of copyright infringement, such as the reposting of newspaper articles 
on blogs; and (3) acquire a partial assignment of copyright that is tailored 
precisely to the infringement identified in step two.23 Note that steps one and 
two can easily be reversed. This model generated significant profits from a 
string of quick settlements. 
The Righthaven model began to look vulnerable when a number of 
defendants established that their conduct fell under the fair use doctrine.24 
But the real problem for Righthaven was that its standing turned out to be 
“nothing more than a fabrication.”25 Only the legal or beneficial owner of an 
exclusive right under copyright law is entitled, or has standing, to sue for 
infringement.26 The limited exclusive rights to the original content that 
Righthaven received appeared to satisfy the requirement for copyright 
standing. But those assignments were subject to a secret “Strategic Alliance 
Agreement,” meaning that Righthaven possessed nothing more than a right 
to sue.27 An agreement transferring the right to sue without any of the 
copyright owner’s other exclusive rights is ineffectual. Following these 
 
 23.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
723, 739–40 (2013). 
 24.  E.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147–51 (D. Nev. 2011), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013); Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., 
No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 4115413, at *1–3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010); Righthaven LLC 
v. Klerks, No. 2:10-cv-00741-GMN-LRL, 2010 WL 3724897, at *2–5 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010) 
(finding a sufficient meritorious fair use defense to set aside a default). 
 25.  Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (D. Nev. 
2011). 
 26.  See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 27.  Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (stating Section 7.2 of the Strategic 
Alliance Agreement between Righthaven and Stephens Media provided that “[d]espite any such 
Copyright Assignment, Stephens Media shall retain (and is hereby granted by Righthaven) an 
exclusive license to Exploit the Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights for any lawful purpose 
whatsoever and Righthaven shall have no right or license to Exploit or participate in the receipt 
of royalties from the Exploitation of the Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights other than the right 
to proceeds in association with a Recovery” (emphasis omitted)). 
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revelations, Righthaven’s suits were dismissed, and the firm quickly 
succumbed to legal fees and went into insolvency.28 
In his thought-provoking article on the copyright troll phenomenon, 
Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh offered the following definition: “A 
copyright troll refers to an entity whose business revolves around the 
systematic legal enforcement of copyrights in which it has acquired a limited 
ownership interest.”29 Balganesh argued that the real problem with copyright 
trolls is not delegation of enforcement itself but rather that it disrupts the 
“enforcement equilibrium” that is integral to copyright’s function as an 
institution.30 
This seems to fit the Righthaven story, but perhaps a little too well. 
Righthaven targeted largely non-commercial defendants whose alleged 
infringements were inconsequential to the copyright owner’s bottom line. 
Righthaven disrupted the previous enforcement equilibrium by attempting to 
monetize borderline infringement cases that—without its intervention—
would have either been ignored or tolerated. Balganesh’s definition of 
copyright trolls, which focuses on the delegation of enforcement to a separate 
entity, has echoes of patent law’s concerns with non-practicing entities and 
patent aggregators. 
Righthaven is a compelling example, but it is just one instance.31 As this 
Article shows, a status-based conception of copyright trolling does not fit 
particularly well with the predominant form of copyright trolling in federal 
courts over the last few years. MDJD lawsuits typically do not involve any 
assignment of rights. By focusing on delegation through assignment, a status-
based definition overlooks the reality of copyright trolling. Arguably, there is 
still a form of delegation in MDJD cases—these suits are given to specialized 
law firms who often recruit their clients. If these specialized law firms are 
working on contingency, their incentives will be virtually the same as an entity 
that acquired rights solely for the purpose of litigation. An entrepreneurial 
law firm’s willingness to pursue infringement allegations on contingency 
makes any status-based definition of trolls and trolling in copyright obsolete.32 
 
 28.  Ian Polonsky, You Can’t Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and Copyright Trolling on 
the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 87–90 (2012). 
 29.  Balganesh, supra note 23, at 732. 
 30.  Id. at 728–29. 
 31.  Another example unrelated to MDJD litigation is arguably the textile printer L.A. 
Printex. Charles Colman, California Federal Jury Finds for Copyright Plaintiff L.A. Printex in Aeropostale 
Fabric Pattern Case: Blurgh, LAW FASHION (Feb. 1, 2013), http://lawoffashion.com/blog/story/ 
02/01/2013/173 (“L.A. Printex has developed something of a bad reputation in the fashion 
world, having brought more copyright infringement cases than one can count against a plethora 
of fashion designers and retailers, most of whom find it cheaper to settle than to fight the 
frequently questionable lawsuits.”). See generally L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 
F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 32.  Statements about the relationship between the plaintiffs and their legal counsel in 
MDJD cases are necessarily merely generalizations. 
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Different economic fundamentals drive patent litigation, but the evidence 
from copyright raises serious doubts about the current status-based definition 
of patent trolls. 
Discussions focusing on Righthaven promote the idea that the problem 
with copyright trolls is that they disrupt existing conventions of tolerated 
use.33 MDJD file-sharing lawsuits typically do not relate to fair use or tolerated 
use. Unauthorized file sharing using BitTorrent is usually a clear-cut case of 
copyright infringement; it is not a legal gray area.34 Mainstream creative 
industries strenuously object to unauthorized file sharing, and it is clearly not 
fair use or de minimis. 
2. Beyond Righthaven 
It makes more sense to define trolling in practice than to attempt to 
identify trolls in the abstract. In other words, to define what makes a litigant 
a troll, it is better to focus on conduct rather than status. Copyright trolling 
cannot be defined by characteristics such as whether the plaintiff is the 
original owner of the copyright, or whether the plaintiff has attempted to 
license the work in the marketplace. These indicia may be useful shortcuts, 
but they would exclude the majority of copyright troll litigation. We should, 
in short, identify instances of trolling rather than looking for trolls per se. 
If there is a unifying characteristic of patent and copyright trolls, it is that 
they are systematic opportunists.35 Agreeing on an exact definition of trolls is 
difficult because there are many different manifestations of opportunism in 
IP litigation. In the patent context, some plaintiffs are labeled as trolls because 
they exploit flaws in the administration of the patent system, such as the 
uncertain scope of patent claims and the poor quality of patent examination. 
Others are labeled as trolls because they take advantage of asymmetric stakes 
and the high cost of litigation to extract settlements or licensing fees based 
on dubious claims. The claims may be dubious in the sense that, if fully 
litigated, the defendant would be very likely to win. The troll’s case may also 
be dubious in the sense that, even if their patents are technically valid and 
infringed under our current legal standards, this is simply because those 
standards have failed to adequately promote investment in innovation and 
invention. 
 
 33.  See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008) (discussing examples 
of tolerated use and the difference between tolerated use and implicitly licensed use). 
 34.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 963 (2005); 
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 35.  On opportunism in general, see generally Kenneth Ayotte et al., A Safety Valve Model of 
Equity as Anti-Opportunism (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-15, 2013), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245098 (explaining the development of equity as part of the law’s 
response to the problem of opportunism). 
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In addition to opportunism in litigation strategy, basing a business on 
litigation is arguably a form of opportunism itself. Patent trolls acquire and 
assert patents based on their litigation potential rather than the value of the 
underlying technology. On this view, the essence of trolling is that the plaintiff 
is more focused on the business of litigation than on selling a product or 
service. 
Copyright trolls are best defined by a cluster of attributes rather than any 
single definitive feature. A troll that deserves its name asserts rights it does not 
have, makes poorly substantiated claims, or seeks disproportionate 
remedies.36 Trolls do at least one of these things systematically. In copyright, 
this opportunism is primarily directed towards statutory damages. As 
Righthaven showed, statutory damages can make pursuing otherwise 
inconsequential infringements extremely profitable, more profitable than 
licensing those uses in advance could ever have been. As the MDJD cases show, 
statutory damages stack the deck such that the defendant’s underlying liability 
is effectively irrelevant to the settlement calculation. 
B. WHEN DO MULTI-DEFENDANT JOHN DOE LAWSUITS AMOUNT TO COPYRIGHT 
TROLLING? 
Not all BitTorrent lawsuits are copyright trolling. In fact, the Recording 
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) pioneered the MDJD model as part 
of its broader campaign against illegal file sharing over a decade ago. Modern 
copyright trolling follows the RIAA’s template, but with a different motivation. 
In 2003 the RIAA began a widely publicized campaign of lawsuits against 
individual file sharers, characterized by Justice Breyer as “a teaching tool”37 
and by the RIAA itself as “the enforcement phase of its education program.”38 
The RIAA wound down this program in 2008, after over 35,000 individuals 
had been targeted with letters of demand.39 The RIAA and its members are 
not copyright trolls because the industry’s end-user litigation strategy was to 
send a message, not create an independent revenue stream. 
The RIAA sought to channel potential infringers back into the legitimate 
market. In contrast, recent MDJD suits appear to prefer the courthouse over 
 
 36.  Of course, Rule 11 provides for sanctions against plaintiffs and attorneys who make 
frivolous or unsupportable claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. However, establishing a Rule 11 violation is 
notoriously difficult. See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–32, No. 3:11cv532-JAG, 2011 WL 
6182025, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (issuing a show cause order for allegations of harassment, 
though sanctions were not ultimately imposed); Giddings v. Vision House Prod., Inc., 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222, 1230 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that although plaintiff’s legal theory ultimately 
proved to be incorrect, it was not “so objectively baseless to qualify as completely frivolous” and 
thus sanctions under Rule 11 were not warranted). 
 37.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 963 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 38. Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade After Napster, 
40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 602 (2009) (quoting an RIAA press release from September 8, 2003). 
 39.  See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 19, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB122966038836021137. 
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the market place. In 2010, a Hollywood production company, Voltage 
Pictures, filed a series of lawsuits against thousands of John Does for 
downloading its film The Hurt Locker over BitTorrent.40 These suits were filed 
as Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5000,41 and eventually totaled 24,500 
defendants.42 The Voltage Pictures cases have now been voluntarily dismissed, 
but only after thousands of user records were subpoenaed from ISPs and 
thousands of demand letters were sent to account subscribers. The plaintiff’s 
lawyers confirmed that this litigation campaign was not intended to deter or 
compensate but to “creat[e] a revenue stream and monetiz[e] the equivalent 
of an alternative distribution channel.”43 
C. THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-DEFENDANT JOHN DOE LAWSUITS 
This section explores the economic fundamentals of copyright trolling 
by modeling the costs and benefits of MDJD litigation from the plaintiff’s 
point of view. 
The plaintiff (or realistically, the plaintiff’s lawyer) in any MDJD lawsuit 
faces certain fixed costs (Cf) such as detecting potential infringement, 
drafting the initial complaint, drafting a motion for discovery, and appearing 
in court to argue for discovery. Detecting potential infringement requires an 
investment in technology or technological expertise.44 The remaining fixed 
costs largely consist of attorney time. These costs do not change significantly 
whether there is one defendant or 5000 in a single case. The plaintiff also 
incurs the variable cost (Cv) of the time and effort it takes to persuade ISPs to 
divulge subscriber information and to persuade those subscribers to settle. 
Where N is the number of defendants, the plaintiff’s costs can be represented 
as follows: 
Costs = Cf + Cv*N 
The plaintiff’s recovery depends primarily on the average settlement 
obtained (P or payoff), the percentage of defendants who can be persuaded 
to settle (Y or yield) and the number of defendants (N).45 Thus, 
Recovery = P*Y*N 
 
 40.  See Complaint at 1, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5000, No. 1:10-cv-00873 (D.D.C. 
May 24, 2010), 2010 WL 4955131. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  First Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 1, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. 
Vasquez, No. 1:10-cv-00873-BAH (D.D.C. May 31, 2011), 2011 WL 2681946. 
 43.  Eriq Gardner, New Litigation Campaign Quietly Targets Tens of Thousands of Movie 
Downloaders, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
blogs/thr-esq/litigation-campaign-quietly-targets-tens-63769 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44.  It may also be the case that, by contracting with outside technology firms, the cost of 
detecting infringement can be transformed into a variable cost. 
 45.  The obvious simplification here is that there is just one settlement price. In theory, a 
plaintiff with perfect information could extract high settlements from easy targets and low 
settlements from more intransigent ones. 
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To be financially viable, copyright trolling through MDJD litigation 
requires (1) suing as many defendants as possible in a single action to keep 
costs low and (2) leveraging the threat of statutory damages (and sometimes 
other threats) to maximize the product of payoff and yield (P*Y). Thus, 
Profit  = (P*Y*N) – (Cf + Cv*N) 
= N*(P*Y – Cv) – Cf 
This model does not assume that all defendants are liable for copyright 
infringement, but it does assume that the plaintiff’s case is strong enough to 
make some defendants want to settle.46 Even so, a plaintiff cannot expect to 
find the person for every IP address in the lawsuit, nor can it expect every 
defendant to be solvent or to settle without a costly fight. However, the 
plaintiff can expect that most individuals it locates who can pay will eventually 
agree to settle for a few thousand dollars.47 Most defendants in this situation 
will settle because, even with fee shifting, settling for a few thousand dollars 
costs less on a risk-adjusted basis than establishing their innocence in court. 
As discussed in Part III.A, the prospect of paying statutory damages ensures 
that a very small chance of liability is enough to make settlement the best 
option.48 Making money from this litigation depends on dispersing fixed costs 
over a large group of defendants and persuading some defendants to settle 
quickly. Part III of this Article uses this basic economic model to explain the 
significance of joinder, statutory damages, and pornography in MDJD 
lawsuits. 
D. THE RISE OF MULTI-DEFENDANT JOHN DOE LAWSUITS 
Just how widespread are MDJD lawsuits?49 To answer this question, I 
created a database that includes all copyright cases filed in all the federal 
district courts between January 1, 2001 and March 31, 2014.50 “John Doe” 
lawsuits were identified by hand, based initially on the appearance of the 
words “John Doe” and “Doe” in the case title (in plural and singular form).51 
Figure 1 displays the resulting data broken down by circuit, and into three-
year time periods based on the year of filing, beginning with the year 2001. 
 
 46.  Parts III.A (statutory damages) and III.C (pornography) further explain why 
defendants will be motivated to settle, even if the plaintiff’s case is far from watertight. 
 47.  See, e.g., Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (finding that settlement offers were generally about $4000). 
 48.  See infra Part III.A. 
 49.  Many judges have noted the increasing prevalence of these suits. See, e.g., In re 
BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“These 
actions are part of a nationwide blizzard of civil actions brought by purveyors of pornographic 
films alleging copyright infringement by individuals utilizing a computer protocol known as 
BitTorrent.”). 
 50.  MATTHEW SAG, COPYRIGHT FILING DATA (TO JUNE 30 2014) (2014), available at http:// 
matthewsag.com/?page_id=19. 
 51.  Cases with titles such as “___ v. Unknown Parties” were also included. 
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The figure shows the prevalence of John Doe actions as a percentage of all 
copyright filings in each circuit. The figure highlights the recent growth of 
MDJD lawsuits and their uneven geographic concentration. It is particularly 
noteworthy that MDJD suits made up the majority of copyright filings in the 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of John Doe Lawsuits by Circuit, 2001–2003,  
2004–2006, 2007–2009, 2010–2012, 2013–2014(Q1) 
 
 
MDJD suits were almost non-existent ten years ago. As of 2013, they were 
the majority of filings in 19 of the 92 federal district courts.52 John Doe suits 
accounted for just over 19% of filings between 2001 and the first quarter of 
2014,53 but they account for over 43% of filings in 2013 and 46% of filings in 
the first quarter of 2014. The sudden rise of the John Doe copyright lawsuit 
is illustrated by Figure 2, below, which focuses on the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, and the first quarter of 2014. This Figure shows the prevalence of John 
Doe lawsuits as a percentage of all copyright lawsuits over the past four years, 
by state, excluding states with no John Doe copyright suits. 
As the figure below shows, in 2010, there was substantial MDJD litigation 
in the District of Columbia and West Virginia, and small pockets in California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, 
 
 52.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 53.  To be exact, John Doe suits accounted for 8129 out of 41,769 filings. 
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Texas, Utah, and Virginia. By 2012, MDJD suits were the majority of all 
copyright cases filed in Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Interestingly, 2013 saw a sharp 
decline in the proportion of these suits in California and New York. 
 
 
Figure 2. John Doe Lawsuits as a Percentage of All Copyright Lawsuits      
2010 to June 30, 2014, by State 
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This data shows the astonishing growth of John Doe lawsuits. They are 
not just the predominant form of copyright trolling; they are the dominant 
form of copyright litigation in several districts. The massive scale of John Doe 
litigation raises the question of how, if at all, should the Copyright Office 
respond? It is far from apparent that the policy issues John Doe litigation 
raises are on the Copyright Office’s reform agenda.54 
III. STATUTORY DAMAGES, JOINDER & PORNOGRAPHY 
This Part focuses on the role of statutory damages, permissive joinder, 
and pornography in enabling MDJD litigation to thrive. Part III.A explores 
the role of statutory damages in John Doe lawsuits through the economic 
model developed in Part II.A. Part III.B takes the same approach with joinder. 
Part III.C explains why John Doe litigation is so well-suited to allegations of 
infringement concerning pornography and presents new data on how 
prevalent pornography is in this context. Understanding these components is 
vital to developing sound reform proposals, which is the subject of Part IV. 
A. STATUTORY DAMAGES 
U.S. copyright law allows the plaintiff to elect, at any time before final 
judgment, to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages or 
restitution.55 Statutory damages provide compensation for real world harms 
that may be difficult to establish in the courtroom.56 The problem with 
statutory damages, as a matter of both design and application, is that the 
amounts awarded bear no relationship to the harm of infringement, the need 
for deterrence, or generally accepted norms of proportionality in the 
administration of penalties.57 A recent review of statutory damages by 
Samuelson and Wheatland cites several arbitrary, inconsistent, incoherent, 
and excessive statutory damage awards in copyright cases.58 In one of the most 
striking examples, Capitol Records v. Thomas, a jury awarded statutory damages 
 
 54.  See The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 113th Cong. 4–6 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, 
Register of Copyrights), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/113th/ 
113-20_80067.pdf (failing to mention copyright trolls, John Doe litigation); see also Maria A. 
Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 329 (2013) (noting in passing 
that “arguments abound on the subject of statutory damages, suggesting that they are too high, 
too low, too easy or too hard to pursue”). 
 55.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
 56.  See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy 
in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 448 (2009) (discussing the inclusion of statutory 
damages in the 1909 Copyright Act to address complaints about the difficulty of calculating actual 
damages). 
 57.  The only prerequisite for statutory damages is copyright registration. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 412 (requiring registration within three months of publication to qualify for awards of statutory 
damages and attorneys’ fees). For a comprehensive review of the history and current application 
of statutory damages in copyright, see generally Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56. 
 58.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 442–43. 
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of $1.92 million against a defendant who had illegally downloaded about $54 
worth of music on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.59 That is a ratio of over 
35,000 to 1. 
There are many problems with the current statutory damages framework, 
but as they relate to the issue of copyright trolling, the basic defect is that the 
range is too broad and too high. The Copyright Act of 1976 allows for 
statutory damages anywhere in a range between $750 and $150,00060—that 
is the difference between an average-priced 50-inch flat-screen television61 
and the median sale price of a single-family home in the American Midwest.62 
Technically, the upper $30,000 to $150,000 of this range is confined to cases 
of willful infringement63 and should be reserved for truly exceptional cases,64 
however “courts have interpreted willfulness so broadly that those who merely 
should have known their conduct was infringing are often treated as willful 
infringers.”65 
Recall the formula in Part II: Profit = N(PY – Cv) – Cf. Statutory damages 
play a significant role in the profitability of copyright trolling. Without 
statutory damages, defendants might decide that their infringements are so 
trivial that the plaintiff will not bother to pursue them. They might decide to 
wait it out and take the risk. An individual copyright owner who establishes a 
single instance of illegal downloading could hope to recover the retail price 
of their product or the defendant’s profits from infringement. For the typical 
music single, album, television show, or movie, this would range from $1 to 
$20. 
The credible threat of damages as high as $150,000 makes any real risk 
of being found liable for copyright infringement intolerable for anyone who 
is not completely insolvent or staggeringly wealthy. Without statutory 
 
 59.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008). 
“Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs—the equivalent of approximately 
three CDs, costing less than $54.” Id. at 1227. 
 60.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 61.  For example, at the time of writing, the suggested retail price of the Samsung H6203, 
a 50-inch LED television, was $749.99. See LED H6203 Series Smart TV, SAMSUNG, http://www. 
samsung.com/us/video/tvs/UN50H6203AFXZA (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 62.  NAT’L ASS’N. OF REALTORS, SALES PRICE OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES (2014), 
available at http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/2014/embargoes/ehs-09-22/ 
ehs-08-2014-single-family-only-2014-09-22.pdf (reporting the median sales price of existing 
single-family homes in the American Midwest as $143,700 in 2012, $150,800 in November 2013, 
and $155,700 for all of 2013). 
 63.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 64.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 144–45 (1975) (providing for enhanced damages in 
“exceptional cases”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1976) (same); see also Samuelson & 
Wheatland, supra note 56, at 452–63 (summarizing the legislative history). 
 65.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56 at 441; see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04(B)(3)(a) (2013) (citing cases). Note that even those 
defendants with plausible fair use defenses may be characterized as “willful and egregious” 
infringers. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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damages, the plaintiff in a typical BitTorrent suit might recover only nominal 
damages, thus reducing their expected settlement payoff (P) to almost zero. 
For a single infringement, statutory damages increase the potential settlement 
range from a maximum of $20 to a maximum of $150,000. But statutory 
damages do not just increase the average payoff (P); they also reduce the 
Plaintiff’s variable cost (Cv) by helping bring reluctant defendants to settle 
more quickly. In addition, the possibility of a $150,000 verdict makes the 
plaintiff’s claim that it will pursue the case to the bitter end more credible, 
and so it should substantially increase settlement yield (Y).66 For the plaintiff 
in MDJD cases, statutory damages are the pot of gold at the end of the 
litigation rainbow. Statutory damages make the stakes of copyright litigation 
fundamentally uneven. While both plaintiff and defendant could lose and 
have to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees, only the plaintiff is entitled to 
statutory damages. Fee shifting for successful defendants should make troll-
like behavior less rewarding in copyright, but statutory damages negates these 
benefits. 
B. JOINDER 
Joinder also plays an important role in the economics of MDJD litigation. 
Joinder rules favor the plaintiff if they permit joining defendants with a low 
level of relatedness. A low relatedness threshold allows the plaintiff to spread 
its fixed costs across a large number of defendants.67 Joinder rules are also 
plaintiff-friendly if they allow discovery in a MDJD case without a substantial 
investment in proving the alleged underlying infringements.68 
The economic logic of MDJD lawsuits relies on permissive joinder of 
tenuously related defendants in thinly substantiated actions that are never 
intended to go to trial. There is no doubt that BitTorrent is widely used for 
copyright infringement; nonetheless, many of the MDJD cases are 
questionable for two reasons. First, they typically rely on a snapshot of Internet 
activity that does not show that a complete file was downloaded.69 All that the 
snapshot shows is that a download was initiated. Second, the MDJD cases 
assume that the account owner behind an IP address was in fact responsible 
for any use of that account.70 The possibility of hacking, open Wi-Fi networks, 
Internet accounts accessed by multiple users, and mistakes by ISPs open the 
door to numerous highly fact-specific “‘it wasn’t me’ defense[s]”.71 Plaintiffs 
 
 66.  The extent to which more explicitly punitive damages could substitute for statutory 
damages will be discussed in Part IV, infra. 
 67.  Thus Cf/N is reduced. 
 68.  Thus Cf itself is reduced. 
 69.  See, e.g., Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–72, No. 12-cv-14106, 2013 WL 1164024, at *6 n.7 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2013) (noting that “plaintiff’s counsel represented that approximately 95% 
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can overcome these two weaknesses, but only by investing individual time and 
effort into the case, something that is anathema to the copyright trolling 
model. 
The appropriateness of joinder in MDJD litigation has divided federal 
district courts across the country. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow 
plaintiffs to join defendants in a single action subject to two requirements. 
First, the complaint must be asserted against the defendants “jointly, severally, 
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”72 Second, there must be 
common questions of fact or law.73 Importantly, joinder is not merely allowed 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is strongly encouraged. The 
Supreme Court held in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs that “the impulse is toward 
entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to 
the parties.”74 The current split in the district courts on whether joinder is 
proper in MDJD suits centers around whether the phrase “same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” properly applies to the 
participants in a BitTorrent swarm. 
BitTorrent works by segmenting a large file into thousands of smaller 
pieces that can be downloaded in any order and reassembled by the end user. 
This initial process is called “seeding.” Once a file is seeded, it can be 
downloaded by multiple individuals simultaneously. A group of individuals 
downloading the seeded file is known as a “swarm.” One advantage of 
BitTorrent over other file sharing programs is that there is no need to 
maintain a connection between the seeder and the downloader for the 
duration of the download. Any participant in the swarm can download any 
fragment from any other participant who already has it. Swarm members are 
typically downloading and uploading file fragments from other computers in 
the swarm at the same time.75 The probability that any two swarm members 
chosen at random have directly interacted is less than one, and it could be 
quite low in a large swarm. The basic theory in MDJD litigation is that all 
swarm participants are involved in a “series of transactions or occurrences” 
that are sufficiently related to allow joinder.76 
 
of defendants in cases such as this raise some form of the ‘it wasn’t me’ defense”); In re BitTorrent 
Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting the 
“panoply of individual defenses including age, religious convictions, and technological savvy; 
misidentification of ISP accounts; the kinds of WiFi equipment and security software utilized; and 
the location of defendant’s router”). 
 72.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 73.  Id. R. 20(a)(2)(B). 
 74.  United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (stating that “joinder of 
claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged”). 
 75.  Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–68, Nos. 12 cv 6675, 12 cv 6677, 2013 WL 5423872, at 
*4–5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013). 
 76.  See infra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
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Courts are divided about whether participation in a BitTorrent swarm by 
itself meets the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences” standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(A).77 
Many courts have rejected joinder based on swarm participation alone.78 For 
example, the district court in Dragon Quest Products, LLC v. Does 1–100 held 
that: 
[T]he initial seeder, other seeders, the various peers, and the 
Defendants may have participated in this swarm months apart from 
each other. While the four categories of individuals, the initial 
seeder, the other seeders, the peers, and the Defendants, may be 
connected by the same initial seed file, the Court finds that this 
connection alone is not sufficient to establish joinder.79 
A number of courts have taken a broader view, however, and held that 
merely participating in the same swarm is sufficient for joinder under Federal 
Rule 20.80 As the court in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–6 explained, Rule 
20 does not require that defendants acted “in concert” or with any “temporal 
distance or temporal overlap.” All that Rule 20 requires is “a logical 
relationship between the separate causes of action.”81 In Patrick Collins, Inc. v. 
 
 77.  See infra note 78 (listing examples of cases concluding joinder is impermissible or 
inappropriate); infra note 80 (listing examples of cases allowing joinder). 
 78.  See, e.g., SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1–57, No. RWT 12cv22, 2012 WL 1415523, at *2 
(D. Md. Apr. 20, 2012) (denying joinder); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–23, No. 11-cv-15231, 
2012 WL 1019034, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (severing the Doe defendants because the 
infringement of the film via BitTorrent did not constitute “the same transaction or series of 
transactions”); SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1–3036, No. 11-4220 SC, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) (same); MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1–149, No. C11-02331 LB, 2011 WL 
4352110, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding misjoinder where plaintiff “has failed to show 
that any of the 149 Doe defendants actually exchanged any piece of the seed file with one 
another”); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finding no concerted action where plaintiff conceded that defendants “may not have been 
physically present in the swarm on the exact same day and time” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–60, No. C11-01738 SI, 2011 WL 3652521, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (severing defendants where “[p]laintiff d[id] not plead facts 
showing that any particular defendant illegally shared plaintiff’s work with any other particular 
defendant”). 
 79.  Dragon Quest Prods., LLC v. Does 1–100, Civ. Nos. 12–6611 (JHR/AMD), 12–6633 
(NLH/AMD), 13–482 (NLH/AMD), 13–483 (NLH/AMD), 13–484 (NLH/AMD), 13–485 
(NLH/AMD), 13–486 (NLH/AMD), 13–487 (NLH/AMD), 2013 WL 2949407, at *6 (D.N.J. 
June 14, 2013). 
 80.  See, e.g., Bicycle Peddler, LLC v. Does 1–12, 295 F.R.D. 274, 277 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Pac. 
Century Int’l v. Does 1–31, No. 11 C 9064, 2012 WL 2129003, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2012) 
(allowing joinder where “the anonymous defendants participated in the same ‘swarm’”); Patrick 
Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–39, No. 12-cv-00096-AW, 2012 WL 1432224, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2012); 
Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); First Time Videos, LLC v. 
Does 1–76, 276 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 81.  Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–6, 291 F.R.D. 191, 204 (N.D. Ill. 2013); TCYK, LLC 
v. Does 1–62, No. 13 c 3842, 2013 WL 6671675, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2013) (quoting Malibu 
Media, LLC, 291 F.R.D. at 204). 
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Does 1–21, the court found that logical relationship was satisfied because “each 
Defendant affirmatively chose to download the same Torrent file that was 
created by the same initial seeder, intending to: (1) utilize other users’ 
computers to download pieces of the same [copyrighted works], and (2) allow 
his . . . own computer to be used in the infringement by other peers and 
Defendants in the same swarm.”82 
Some plaintiffs have responded by pleading specifically that the Doe 
defendants did, in fact, share the same pieces of the file with each other.83 
Others have focused on groups of John Does who acted within a short time 
frame.84 
On this view, a BitTorrent swarm is in essence a cooperative endeavor, 
whether the participants are personally known to each other or not.85 This 
interpretation is bolstered by Rule 20(a), which refers to a “series of 
transactions or occurrences” and not just the “same transaction.”86 Astute 
plaintiffs have also bolstered the case for joinder by adding claims for 
inducement and contributory liability.87 
Even if the individual participants in a BitTorrent swarm are sufficiently 
related to permit joinder under the Federal Rules, which appears likely, courts 
can still disallow joinder for discretionary reasons.88 Here too, the courts are 
 
 82.  Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–21, 282 F.R.D. 161, 165 (E.D. Mich. 2012); see also Malibu 
Media, LLC, 291 F.R.D. at 202 (citing the same passage); TCYK, LLC, 2013 WL 6671675, at *3 
(citing the same passage). 
 83.  See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–68, Nos. 12 cv 6675, 12 cv 6677, 2013 WL 
5423872, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013) (“Plaintiff bases its allegations on . . . [the fact that] 
John Does accessed the same piece of the copyrighted work, and each piece is identified by a 
unique value known as a ‘Hash Identifier’ or ‘Hash Number.’”); Digital Sin, Inc., 279 F.R.D. at 
243 (declining to sever where the “[p]laintiff claims to have carefully selected only a small group 
of New York-based defendants who traded the exact same file, identifiable by a hash value, as part 
of the same swarm within a six-week period”); Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–75, No. 12 C 1546, 
2012 WL 3717768, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012) (noting that “Sunlust alleges in its complaint 
that the defendants participated in the swarm simultaneously and that it observed the defendants 
transferring data from the Video between themselves”). 
 84.  TCYK, LLC, 2013 WL 6671675, at *4 (finding temporal proximity of 62 Doe 
defendants alleged to have acted within a four-day period sufficient); see also Pac. Century Int’l, 
2012 WL 2129003, at *2 (noting that the defendants allegedly participated in the same swarm at 
varying times spanning just over one month supported permissive joinder). 
 85.  TCYK, LLC, 2013 WL 6671675, at *3 (“Every member of a swarm joins that cooperative 
endeavor knowing that, in addition to downloading the file, they will also facilitate the 
distribution of that identical file to all other members of the swarm.”).  
 86.  Id. at *3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87.  See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–38, 941 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 88.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court 
may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a 
party.” See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 156–57 (finding that although “joinder of 
the defendants may be permissible under FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a), the interests of justice and judicial 
economy would best be served if all of the defendants except Doe Number 1 were severed and 
dropped from the case pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 21”). 
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divided.89 In part, the division of opinion is a conflict between formalism and 
realism. 
For the formalist judge, the complaint ultimately leads to a hearing. If 
joining 5000 loosely related individuals would make it impossible to conduct 
a hearing on the merits, joinder is unsound.90 The court in Third Degree Films, 
Inc. v. Does 1–131 explained the practical problems that make joinder in 
MDJD suits inappropriate: differences in factual and legal defenses would 
generate unrelated motions; scheduling and conducting hearings and 
discovery disputes among a large number of parties would be almost 
impossible; pro se defendants without access to the e-filing system would have 
to serve paper copies of all filings on all other parties; all defendants, 
including those proceeding pro se, would have an interest in attending all 
other parties’ depositions and may do so as a matter of right; and any eventual 
trial would require a hundred separate mini-trials with different witnesses and 
evidence, “eviscerating any ‘efficiency’ of joinder.”91 Cumulatively, these 
obstacles would “needlessly delay the ultimate resolution of any particular 
defendant’s case.”92 Thus, from this perspective, joinder appears unsound. 
For the realist judge, the complaint almost inevitably leads to settlement. 
Thus, joinder is an efficient way to aggregate claims at the early stage of 
litigation for which there is very likely no later stage. The defendants who 
actively contest liability can have their cases severed later. In the meantime, 
allowing MDJD suits to proceed to the discovery stage is efficient because it 
reduces the plaintiff’s costs. 
Realism and formalism are not the only ways to decide if joinder is 
appropriate in MDJD cases. A number of courts have also refused to allow 
MDJD cases to proceed en masse because of their association with “potentially 
abusive litigation tactics.”93 These courts accept that “a valid copyright holder 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–22, No. 12-CV-5091 (SRC)(CLW), 2013 WL 
1704291, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2013) (severing and dismissing all defendants other than John 
Doe 1); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–30, No. 12-3896-MAS, 2012 WL 6203697, at *8–9 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 12, 2012) (permitting joinder); Amselfilm Prods. GMBH & Co. KG v. Swarm 6a6dc, No. 12-
3865 (FSH) (PS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186476, at *1–7 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2012) (finding joinder 
to be inappropriate and severing all defendants except John Doe 1); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 
1–5, 285 F.R.D. 273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (permitting joinder); Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 
1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 169–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining to decide whether joinder was proper, 
but severing all defendants except John Doe 1 based on practical considerations). 
 90.  See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–39, No. 12-6945-MAS-DEA, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44053, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that the court’s “ability to efficiently manage 
the pretrial phases of this action with the present number of defendants could be compromised 
by permitting joinder, causing a strain on judicial resources”). 
 91.  Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–131, 280 F.R.D. 493, 498–99 (D. Ariz. 2012), reh’g 
denied, No. CV 12-0108-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 2383560 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2012). 
 92.  Id. at 499. 
 93.  Third Degree Films v. Does 1–47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 189–91 (D. Mass. 2012) (“In recent 
months, this Court has grown increasingly troubled by ‘copyright trolling,’ specifically as it has 
evolved in the adult film industry. . . . Against this backdrop of mass lawsuits and potentially 
A5_SAG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2015  3:33 PM 
1126 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1105 
is entitled to seek protection of its intellectual property in federal court,” but 
they are wary of suits filed “solely to facilitate demand letters and coerce 
settlement, rather than ultimately serve process and litigate the claims.”94 
Plaintiffs have reinforced this impression by failing to actually serve the 
individual defendants in many cases.95 Courts have noted that in many 
instances settlement’s coercive force comes from the pornography at issue, 
not the alleged copyright infringement.96 The number of Doe defendants 
who rush to settle before being identified in the public record shows the 
extraordinary leverage plaintiffs obtain in John Doe pornography cases.97 
Some courts have also taken issue with the evasion of filing fees.98 For 
example, the court in In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases 
estimated that “plaintiffs have improperly avoided more than $25,000 in 
filing fees by employing its swarm joinder theory. . . . Nationwide, these 
plaintiffs have availed themselves of the resources of the court system on a 
scale rarely seen. It seems improper that they should profit without paying 
statutorily required fees.”99 For these reasons many courts have severed all but 
the first-named defendant and required plaintiffs to re-file individually.100 
 
abusive litigation tactics, courts nationwide have become skeptical of allowing the adult film 
companies unfettered access to the judicial processes of subpoenas and early discovery.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 156–57; Kick Ass Pictures, Inc. 
v. Does 1–25, C.A. No. 12-10810-MLW, 2013 WL 1497229, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2013); Pac. 
Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1–101, No. C-11-02533 (DMR), 2011 WL 5117424, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 27, 2011). 
 94.  Third Degree Films, 286 F.R.D. at 190; see also Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–90, No. 
C 11-03825 HRL, 2012 WL 1094653, at *3 & n.4, *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (“Plaintiff seeks 
to enlist the aid of the court to obtain information through the litigation discovery process so 
that it can pursue a non-judicial remedy that focuses on extracting ‘settlement’ payments from 
persons who may or may not be infringers. This the court is not willing to do.”). 
 95.  See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 2012 WL 1094653, at *3–4, *3 n.4 (refusing to grant 
expedited discovery to subpoena the ISP providers for the Doe defendants’ identities after noting 
that the adult film company plaintiff conceded that, to its knowledge, neither it nor any other 
plaintiff had ever served a single Doe defendant after early discovery had been granted). 
 96.  Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66 (expressing “concern[] that joinder is 
being used ‘to facilitate a low-cost, low-risk revenue model for the adult film companies’”) 
(quoting Third Degree Films, 286 F.R.D. at 197); see also id. at 157 (“Although the record before 
this court reveals no evidence of improper tactics or bad faith by Patrick Collins in this action, 
the fact that four settlements have occurred before any of the defendants have been identified in 
the public record illustrates how these types of cases create a strong tool for leveraging early 
settlements.”). 
 97.  Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 157. 
 98.  E.g., In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 92 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Third Degree Films, 286 F.R.D. at 198 (“[T]he Court has not observed any specific bad 
faith behavior in this case by [the plaintiff] to date . . . . [T]he Court takes issue with the general 
structure of this case and like cases, and has determined that the most appropriate method to 
protect against any potential coercion is to sever the Doe defendants and require them to be sued 
individually.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (noting 
that “joinder is not in the best interests of the defendants and is likely to cause them prejudice”). 
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C. THE COPYRIGHT TROLLING-PORNOGRAPHY NEXUS 
Conventional wisdom asserts that 15% of Internet traffic is comprised of 
cat videos101 and 30% is pornography.102 Cat videos do not feature 
prominently in MDJD lawsuits. Pornography is another story.103 To investigate 
the copyright trolling–pornography nexus, I generally reviewed at least one 
underlying complaint per John Doe plaintiff in the dataset and coded the 
plaintiff as either “pornography” or “not pornography” accordingly.104 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of John Doe Lawsuits by Circuit, 2001 to 2013 
 
 
 101.  See, e.g., John Blackstone, Cat Videos Take Over Internet, Marketing World, CBS NEWS (Sept. 2, 
2013, 8:18 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/cat-videos-take-over-internet-marketing-world/. 
 102.  See Porn Sites Get More Visitors Each Month Than Netflix, Amazon and Twitter Combined, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/ 
internet-porn-stats_n_3187682.html. 
 103.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the question of the copyright status of 
pornographic works. Pornography is not generally illegal and even if it were, “the prevailing view 
is that even illegality is not a bar to copyrightability.” Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 
755 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982) (arguing 
that “an obscenity defense would fragment copyright enforcement”); Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. 
Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 862–63 (5th Cir. 1979) (doubting the effectiveness of 
denying copyright protection as a way of discouraging obscenity production). But see Ann Bartow, 
Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1 (2012) (questioning whether copyright should 
protect pornography and particular sub-categories of pornography). 
 104.  For some plaintiffs, an Internet search was sufficient to identify them as being in the 
pornography business. For others, I relied on descriptions of works as “adult content,” 
descriptions on Internet Movie Database, and reasonable inferences from titles such as “My Little 
Panties # 2.” I did not watch any of the underlying titles. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the relative frequency of John Doe litigation as a 
percentage of all copyright litigation broken down by circuit and into three-
year time periods based on the year of filing, beginning with the year 2001. 
Figure 3 differs from Figure 1 in that it differentiates between pornography-
related John Doe litigation and other John Doe litigation. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of John Doe Lawsuits in Selected Districts,  
2010 to June 30, 2014 
 
Figure 4 takes a selection of the same data and shows how the relative 
frequency of pornography-focused John Doe litigation has changed in 
selected districts over the last five years. The districts shown are those with 
high pornography filing ratios during at least one filing year from 2010 to 
2014. 
In 2010, only the Northern District of West Virginia saw more 
pornography cases than any other type of copyright case. In 2011 the 
Northern District of Florida and the District of Columbia took that honor. In 
2012, 2013, and the first quarter of 2014 there were 10, 11, and 9 districts, 
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respectively, where pornography cases outnumbered any other type of 
copyright case.105 
Why so much pornography? The prevalence of pornography in MDJD 
lawsuits could be attributed to the adult entertainment industry itself. It might 
be, for example, that the industry is generally more innovative and less 
convention bound and so is simply the first to adopt what may soon be a 
broader trend.106 Indeed, there are anecdotal reports that low-budget and 
independent films are bringing MDJD suits. This suggests that the appeal of 
MDJD litigation may be expanding. A related explanation would be that 
pornography producers are less concerned about negative publicity than 
other creative industries.107 A closer look into MDJD litigation suggests two 
additional structural explanations. 
The first structural explanation is simply that copyright trolling is 
particularly well suited to pornography because the plaintiff can threaten 
accused infringers with public exposure. This additional incentive to settle 
fundamentally transforms the viability of such an enterprise. As noted 
previously, the profitability of MDJD lawsuits depends on keeping costs low 
and recovery high. 
Recall that Profit = N(PY – Cv) – Cf. Hypothetically, if the plaintiff faces 
$100,000 in fixed costs and an average variable cost of $1000 per defendant, 
MDJD litigation would be unprofitable if the plaintiff achieved an average 
settlement of $3000 (P=3000) and a yield of 30% (Y=0.3) in a lawsuit 
targeting 5000 IP addresses (N=5000). This would result in a loss of $150,000 
on an investment of $5.1 million.108 But assuming that the threat of public 
exposure as a pornography consumer motivates more people to settle more 
quickly, the enterprise would become profitable to the tune of $3.9 million 
simply by increasing the yield from 30% to 60%.109 In short, one reason that 
the MDJD model is used in relation to pornography more than any other 
subject matter is that the social stigma of pornography increases both yield 
(Y) and payoff (P) while keeping the plaintiff’s variable costs (Cv) low. 
The second structural explanation for the prevalence of pornographic 
subject matter in copyright trolling is that a small number of entrepreneurial 
 
 105.  In 2012 those districts were: California (E.D.); California (S.D.); the District of 
Columbia; Florida (N.D.); Illinois (C.D.); Illinois (S.D.); Indiana (N.D.); Maryland; Pennsylvania 
(E.D.); and Virginia (E.D.);  In 2013 those districts were: Alabama (S.D.); the District of 
Columbia; Illinois (C.D.); Illinois (N.D.); Indiana (N.D.); Maryland; Michigan (E.D.); Tennessee 
(W.D.); Wisconsin (E.D.); Wisconsin (W.D.); and Pennsylvania (E.D.). In the first quarter of 2014 
those districts were: Colorado; the District Of Columbia; Florida (M.D.); Florida (S.D.); Illinois 
(N.D.); Maryland; Michigan (W.D.); Pennsylvania (E.D.); and Pennsylvania (M.D.). 
 106.  See generally Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the Internet, 49 
FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1996) (discussing pornography’s role at the vanguard of new technology). 
 107.  This seems entirely speculative. 
 108.  Profit = N(PY – Cv) – Cf = 5000(3000*0.30 – 1000) – 100,000 = -150,000. 
 109.  Profit = N(PY – Cv) – Cf = 5000(3000*0.60 – 1000) – 100,000 = 3,900,000. 
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lawyers and plaintiffs initiate a significant amount of this litigation.110 The 
most well-known is the Prenda Law firm.111 A group of entities associated with 
Prenda Law have amassed millions of dollars in MDJD settlements.112 
According to media reports and court records, Prenda leveraged the social 
stigma associated with pornography by “post[ing non-settling defendants’ 
names] on its website, along with a link to the lawsuit.”113 In an unrelated case, 
lawyers were censured for attaching an erroneous exhibit listing several other 
adult films that defendants were alleged to have downloaded that were 
unrelated to the litigation.114 These techniques leverage the threat of 
exposure to force settlement. 
Attorneys associated with Prenda have been ruthless in pursuing profits 
and have also been sanctioned for deceit and unethical behavior.115 
Defendants in a Florida case involving Prenda have presented evidence that 
 
 110.  The appearance of the same counsel, making virtually identical claims, and using 
virtually identical filings has not gone unnoticed by the courts. See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. 
Does 1–38, 941 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 111.  See Guava, LLC v. Does 1–5, No. 1:12-CV-8000, 2013 WL 3270663, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 
27, 2013) (“The aggressive tactics of Guava’s counsel, Prenda Law, in litigating John Doe lawsuits 
have been widely reported and acknowledged by courts, including those in Illinois and 
California.”); see also Joe Mullin, ‘Porn Troll’ Prenda Law Sanctioned in Defamation Lawsuit, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/porn-troll-
prenda-law-sanctioned-in-defamation-lawsuit/. 
 112.  Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made a ‘Few Million Dollars’ 
Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) ‘Porn Pirates’, FORBES (October 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/15/how-porn-copyright-lawyer-john-steele-justifies-his-
pursuit-of-sometimes-innocent-porn-pirates/. Note that the Prenda legal team appears to have 
begun under the firm title Steele Hansmeier PLLC and has now changed its name to the Anti-
Piracy Law Group. See Mike Masnick, Prenda Law Accused of Trying to Start Over Again Under a New 
Name, TECHDIRT (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:49 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121214/ 
22290621392/prenda-law-accused-trying-to-start-over-again-under-new-name.shtml. 
 113.  Claire Suddath, Prenda Law, the Porn Copyright Trolls, BUS. WK. (May 30, 2013), http:// 
www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-30/prenda-law-the-porn-copyright-trolls. 
 114.  Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–3, Nos. 13-C-536, 13-C-544, 13-C-779, 2013 WL 6579338, 
at *5 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2013); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–11, Nos. 13-cv-205-wmc, 
13-cv-207-wmc, 13-cv-208-wmc, 13-cv-209-wmc, 13-cv-315-wmc, 13-cv-317-wmc, 13-cv-318-wmc, 
13-cv-319-wmc, 13-cv-320-wmc, 13-cv-321-wmc, 13-cv-322-wmc, 2013 WL 4821911, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 10, 2013) (imposing sanctions). But see Malibu Media, LLC v. Helferich, No. 1:12-cv-
00842-TWP-MJD, 2014 WL 690921, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2014) (denying Motion for 
Sanctions by defendants). 
 115.  Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith, 761 F.3d 699, 712 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming orders 
for sanctions and an order holding Duffy, Steele, and Hansmeier in civil contempt); Lightspeed 
Media Corp. v. Smith, No. 12-889-GPM, 2013 WL 6225093, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2013) (stating 
“the Court has no doubt that Duffy, Steele, and Hansmeier are closely associated and acted in 
concert to file and prosecute this frivolous lawsuit”); Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-
ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at *2–3, *5 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (finding that “the Principals 
engaged in vexatious litigation designed to coerce settlement” and that “Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated their willingness to deceive not just this Court, but other courts where they have 
appeared,” and awarding sanctions against lawyers Steele, Hansmeier, Duffy and Gibbs, the 
Prenda Law firm and their clients AF Holdings and Ingenuity 13 based on the “Plaintiffs’ brazen 
misconduct and relentless fraud”). 
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someone inside the firm was “seeding” its own content, i.e., making 
pornography available for illegal download in the first place, in an attempt to 
induce copyright infringement.116 Prenda lawyers have also been accused of 
colluding in litigation,117 lying to the court,118 forging documents,119 and 
identity theft.120 
The following two tables show the influence of Prenda and entities 
associated with it. They list the top plaintiffs in copyright suits against John 
Does. Table 1 lists the top 20 plaintiffs between 2001 and 2014 ranked 
according to the total number of John Doe defendants. Table 2 lists the top 
five John Doe plaintiffs in each year 2010 to 2014. 
 
Table 1. Top 20 Copyright John Doe Plaintiffs 2001–2014 
by Total Number of Defendants 
Plaintiff Suits Filed 
Largest Single 
Suit 
Total Doe 
Defendants 
Ott (an individual) 1 15,551 15,551 
Patrick Collins, Inc. 224 3757 11,460 
Third Degree Films 56 3577 8288
New Sensations, Inc. 17 1768 7502
Braun 9 7098 7106
Digital Sin, Inc. 19 5698 6476
Malibu Media, LLC 1709 81 6280
Discount Video Center, Inc. 3 5041 5150
On The Cheap, LLC 1 5011 5011
West Coast Productions, Inc. 24 2010 4761
Diabolic Video Productions, Inc. 2 2099 4198
Sbo Pictures 13 3036 3637
Zero Tolerance Entertainment 6 2943 3128
Openminded Solutions, Inc. 17 2925 2979
Third World Media, Inc. 7 1568 2977
Hard Drive Productions, Inc. 57 1000 2853
Teyk, LLC 128 131 2609
Media Products, Inc. 24 1257 2550
Combat Zone 35 1037 2165
Megip, LLC 18 1164 1698
Total 2370 106,379 
 
 
 116.  Cyrus Farivar, Prenda Seeded Its Own Porn Files Via BitTorrent, New Affidavit Argues, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 3, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/prenda-
seeded-its-own-porn-files-via-bittorrent-new-affidavit-shows/. 
 117.  Mike Masnick, ‘Defendant’ in Prenda Law Case Reveals He Agreed to Take a Dive, TECHDIRT 
(Jan. 25, 2013, 6:44 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130125/15575421793/ 
defendant-prenda-law-case-reveals-he-agreed-to-take-dive.shtml. 
 118.  See Ingenuity 13 LLC, 2013 WL 1898633, at *4. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at *1. 
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The only Prenda-related entity listed on Table 1 is Hard Drive 
Productions, Inc.121 In Table 2, however, Prenda-related entities claim two of 
the top five positions in 2011 and 2012. It is important to note that the 
methodology of counting John Doe defendants is under-inclusive. Doe 
numbers were derived from the case captions themselves—for example, 
Digital Sin, Inc v. Does 1–208 would be counted as 208 John Doe defendants, 
but Digital Sin, Inc v. Does or Digital Sin, Inc. v. Unknown Parties would be 
counted as a single John Doe defendant. 
 
Table 2. Top Five Copyright John Doe Plaintiffs, 2010–2014 
 Plaintiff Cases % John Doe Cumulative % 
2014 Malibu, LLC* 821 85.97 85.97 
 Dallas Buyers Club, LLC 79 8.27 94.24 
 Countryman Nevada, LLC 29 3.04 97.28 
 TCYK, LLC 9 0.94 98.22 
 Voltage Pictures 3 0.31 98.53 
2013 Malibu Media, LLC* 1027 64.71 64.71 
 TCYK, LLC  116 7.31 72.02 
 Killer Joe Nevada, LLC 49 3.09 75.11 
  Voltage Pictures  45 2.84 77.95 
  Zambezia Film  41 2.58 80.53 
2012 Malibu Media, LLC* 333 27.82 27.82 
 Patrick Collins, Inc.* 131 10.94 38.76 
 AF Holdings, LLC *✝ 124 10.36 49.12 
  Ingenuity 13, LLC *✝  67 5.6 54.72 
  Quad International, Inc. 59 4.93 59.65 
2011 Patrick Collins, Inc.* 88 21.31 21.31 
 K-Beech, Inc.* 61 14.77 36.08 
 Hard Drive Productions, Inc.* 52 12.59 48.67 
 Boy Racer, Inc.*✝  18 4.36 53.03 
 First Time Videos, LLC *✝  18 4.36 57.38 
2010 IO Group, Inc.* 10 12.99 12.99 
 LFP Internet Group, LLC* 5 6.49 19.48 
 Digital Content Protection, LLC* 4 5.19 24.68 
 Patrick Collins, Inc.* 4 5.19 29.87 
 Griggs 3 3.9 33.77 
* Lawsuits related to pornography 
✝ Plaintiffs associated with the Prenda Law Firm 
 
  
 
 121.  According to media reports, Hard Drive Productions stopped working with Prenda in 
late 2012. See Suddath, supra note 113. 
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The significance of repeat players may also explain the uneven 
geographic distribution of MDJD lawsuits.122 Table 3, below, shows the 
number of John Doe suits by district for the 21 districts with the most John 
Doe lawsuits from 2010 to mid-2014. 
 
Table 3.  John Doe Suits by District 
District John Doe (other) Pornography Combined 
Illinois (N.D.) 147 438 585 
Pennsylvania (E.D.) 11 374 385 
Colorado 70 311 381 
Maryland 4 316 320 
Florida (M.D.) 101 172 273 
Michigan (E.D.) 7 176 183 
Florida (S.D.) 4 150 154 
Ohio (S.D.) 64 72 135 
California (N.D.) 5 127 132 
California (C.D.) 13 115 128 
New York (S.D.) 60 68 128 
New Jersey 20 104 124 
District of Columbia 15 104 119 
Virginia (E.D.) 0 97 97 
Michigan (W.D.) 5 73 78 
California (E.D.) 2 68 70 
Indiana (S.D.) 1 66 67 
Illinois (C.D.) 11 51 62 
Indiana (N.D.) 22 39 61 
Ohio (N.D.) 32 27 59 
Wisconsin (E.D.) 7 49 56 
 
The copyright troll-pornography nexus illustrates how a system of 
incentives can lead to unintended results. Pornography is uniquely well suited 
to exploit the litigation incentives of our current copyright system. Copyright 
is meant to establish market-based incentives for the production of creative 
works. However, for some plaintiffs, the litigation incentives established by 
permissive joinder and statutory damages are more attractive. 
IV. REFORMS 
A. THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR REFORM 
For purposes of a rational discussion about copyright trolling, as opposed 
to a wholesale reappraisal of the copyright system, we should accept 
copyright’s central dogma that exclusive rights effectively incentivize the 
 
 122.  The courts have noticed the same counsel making the same claims and using the same 
filings. See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–38, 941 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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creation and distribution of expressive works.123 In less abstract terms this 
means, at the very least, accepting that unauthorized file sharing is a civil 
wrong that deserves a remedy—there is no legal justification for someone who 
can pay a reasonable price for legitimate access to Game of Thrones to instead 
download it via BitTorrent.124 In short, the problem with John Doe lawsuits is 
not that individual infringers face the risk of detection and sanction—an 
unenforceable copyright law would provide no incentives. The primary 
problems with John Doe litigation relate to the fairness of the judicial process. 
John Doe suits against anonymous Internet filesharers allow infringement 
accusations to proceed based on a minimal investigation. Defendants are 
often subject to leverage that crosses the line into extortion and cannot 
effectively defend themselves. Once an ISP names an individual, the burden 
of proof is effectively reversed. This is because, unless a defendant has a lawyer 
that is willing to work on contingency, the cost of establishing their innocence 
vastly exceeds the settlement payoffs demanded by plaintiffs. Fee shifting is 
available for successful defendants in copyright cases, but it is not 
guaranteed,125 and it does not level the playing field. Innocent defendants 
must calculate the expected value of litigation versus settlement with 
reference to the small probability that the plaintiff will prevail. If the 
 
 123.  The utilitarian foundation of copyright can be traced back to its origins in England: the 
1710 act “for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors 
or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned,” or the Statute of Anne as it is 
now known. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann. c. 19 (1710). This purposive conception of copyright is also 
clearly reflected in the U.S. Constitution which provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . 
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not 
to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8) (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154 (1975)). The rights of 
authors are not the ends of the copyright system, but they are an important means by which those 
ends are achieved. As the Court observed in Harper & Row, “[b]y establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
 124.  Unauthorized file-sharing is not fair use. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 
2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 125.  See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2013) (allowing for attorney’s fees to be awarded to the prevailing 
party at the court’s discretion). The Supreme Court has held that prevailing plaintiffs and 
prevailing defendants must be treated alike under § 505. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 
534–35 (1994). 
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defendant prevails and is awarded attorney fees, his126 profit is zero at best.127 
If the defendant loses, his combined liability for statutory damages and 
attorney fees could easily exceed $100,000. Even if the chance of this 
catastrophic loss is only 5%, the defendant’s expected loss is $5000. The 
potential for six-figure statutory damage awards compounds the problem of 
litigation costs by making the downside risk for a defendant who fails to 
establish his innocence untenable on most objective risk-reward calculations. 
For the innocent and guilty alike, the rational response to a demand letter is 
to settle. In this context, the discovery orders that link IP addresses to personal 
individual information are little more than a judicially sanctioned hunting 
license. 
Arguably, another problem with MDJD lawsuits is that they lower the cost 
of copyright enforcement too far. Although some enforcement is required for 
copyright’s incentives to function, it is wrong to assume that more 
enforcement is always better. The idea that copyright should always be 
enforced is equivalent to suggesting that every trespass should lead to 
litigation. Like other property rights, copyright is a private right that creates 
the option of enforcement. We expect landholders and copyright owners 
alike to enforce their rights when their benefits outweigh their costs. 
Litigation invokes significant public resources and has potentially significant 
public costs. Attaching a positive cost to litigation through filing fees or other 
procedural mechanisms is an important screening mechanism that deters 
marginal complaints and trivial claims. Filing fees and the like help allocate 
judicial resources toward more valuable claims. 
B. REFORM PROPOSALS 
With these normative foundations in place, we can now consider some 
concrete reform proposals. 
1. Reasonable Statutory Damages 
Copyright law’s statutory damages framework leads to awards that are 
unreasonably high in contexts such as unauthorized file-sharing. In the 
standard BitTorrent case, statutory damages are likely to amount to tens of 
thousands of dollars, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.128 The threat of 
statutory damages makes resistance—even to unreasonable plaintiff 
demands—irrational from an economic perspective. At their current levels, 
 
 126.  Perhaps because of the close association between copyright trolling and pornography, 
the vast majority of defendants appear to be men. 
 127.  It is not truly zero because the defendant must finance the litigation and the interest 
or opportunity cost is not part of the attorney fee calculation. If the defendant’s lawyer works on 
contingency, however, the cost is truly zero. 
 128.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, 593 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2009); Capitol 
Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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statutory damages are a coercive tool that can be wielded just as effectively 
against the innocent as the guilty. 
Ideally, Congress would reform statutory damages, but even if Congress 
fails to do so,129 courts have a statutory and constitutional obligation to oversee 
the application of statutory damages.130 Courts should recognize that, in the 
typical BitTorrent lawsuit, statutory damages are punitive: it is hard to see how 
damages that clearly exceed any plausible measure of compensation or 
restitution could be anything else.131 This does not mean that there is no place 
for them. On the contrary, it is quite likely that punitive damages are necessary 
to deter illegal file-sharing. Like parking violations and cheating on taxes, the 
probability of a file-sharer being detected is low but the cumulative harm of 
widespread infringement may be significant.132 Where the probability of 
detection is low, punitive statutory damages tilt the cost-benefit calculation of 
buying versus stealing back in the direction of legal acquisition. Where 
statutory damages exceed the wrong suffered, they should be justified under 
a deterrence theory and subject to the same constitutional constraints as other 
forms of punitive damages. Currently, neither is the case. For example, the 
district court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. approved a $53 million 
settlement for statutory damages and attorney fees against a music streaming 
service that relied on an aggressive (and ultimately flawed) reading of the fair 
 
 129.  The current administration is clearly in favor of statutory damages in copyright law. The 
United States both encourages and mandates the adoption of statutory damage rules in copyright 
law through bilateral and regional trade agreements and through the Special 301 review process. 
See Pamela Samuelson et al., Statutory Damages: A Rarity in Copyright Laws Internationally, But for 
How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 529, 536–44 (2013). Note also that Canada recently 
amended its copyright law to reduce the range of statutory damages to a maximum of $5000 for 
non-commercial infringement. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 38.1 (2012). 
 130.  Section 504 expressly states that within the applicable range, the award of statutory 
damages should be “as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C § 504; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”). 
 131.  Tellingly, section 504(c) of the 1976 Act omits the part of its 1909 Act predecessor that 
provided that statutory damages are not intended as a penalty. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) 
(1976), with 17 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1926). 
 132.  There is extensive literature that attempts to establish and quantify the effect of file 
sharing. Proving causality and estimating the size of any effect is extremely difficult because 
although music sales declined sharply after Napster emerged in 1999, this decline was at least 
partially attributable to the end of the CD replacement cycle, a sustained economic downturn in 
much of the Western world, and the increased competition for entertainment spending 
attributable to the Internet and video games. See generally Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative 
Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (2006) (finding an effect); Alejandro 
Zentner, Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on Music Purchases, 49 J.L & ECON. 63, 65–66 (2006) 
(same). But see Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: 
An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007) (finding no causality between declining music 
sales and peer-to-peer file-sharing); Joel Waldfogel, Bye, Bye, Miss American Pie? The Supply of New 
Recorded Music Since Napster 7–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16882, 
2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16882.pdf (finding no evidence that changes 
since Napster have affected the quantity of new recorded music or artists coming to market). 
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use doctrine.133 Rational deterrence theory suggests that where the probability 
of detection is low, damages must be higher to reduce the expected gains 
from law-breaking.134 The probability that MP3.com would be detected was 
100%, however, because it was bound to attract the record industry’s 
attention. The damages/profits accrued by the time of trial were not 
substantial. Given the large number of copyrights infringed in that case, even 
the minimum statutory damages award plus attorney fees would have 
provided substantial deterrence. And yet the trial judge saw fit to approve a 
settlement well above the statutory minimum. Cases like MP3.com and Capitol 
Records v. Thomas-Rasset are also difficult to reconcile with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s guidance that “few awards [of punitive damages] exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant 
degree, will satisfy due process.”135 Although copyright scholars have 
addressed the possible unconstitutionality of statutory damages, courts have 
not yet applied the constitutional standards of tort litigation to copyright 
law.136 
Statutory damages should take the need for deterrence into account, but 
the courts must recognize that there are logical and constitutional limits to 
the level of damages that deterrence justifies. The fact that statutory damages 
for file-sharing can exceed the financial penalty for kidnapping violates the 
principle of marginal deterrence as well as common decency.137 Copyright 
owners should not be indifferent to whether the public thinks copyright 
penalties are fair.138 Depoorter, Van Hiel, and Vanneste offer substantial 
experimental evidence to suggest that in the context of file sharing, effective 
 
 133.  See generally UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Jim Hu, MP3.com Pays $53.4 Million to End Copyright Suit, CNET (Nov. 15, 2000, 11:20 AM), http:// 
news.cnet.com/MP3.com-pays-53.4-million-to-end-copyright-suit/2100-1023_3-248583.html. 
 134.  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS 
OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 17 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, eds., 1974). 
 135.  Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. The Court also noted that “award[s] of more than four times 
the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” 
Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)); see also BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996). 
 136.  See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(finding that an award of $675,000 for infringement of 30 songs did not offend due process); 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907–10 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding an 
award of $222,000 in statutory damages for infringement of 24 songs), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
1584 (2013); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586–88 (6th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting Due Process Clause challenges and upholding a statutory damage award of 
$806,000, representing a 44:1 ratio of statutory to actual damages), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1032 
(2008); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458–60 (D. Md. 2004) 
(rejecting a due process challenge to a $19 million jury verdict for copyright infringement where 
the defendant argued that actual harm was limited to $59,000). 
 137.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines section 5E1.2 establishes a fine range of 
$17,500 to $175,000 for crimes at a base offense level from 32–34, such as kidnapping. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A4.1, 5E1.2 (2013). 
 138.  See generally Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011). 
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deterrence may be impossible “without raising enforcement to levels that 
undermine support for the underlying rules” and that “when enforcement 
reaches levels that are perceived as normatively excessive, this can have the 
inadvertent effect of moving behavior in the opposite direction from that 
intended by the law.”139 They conclude, “[i]n the context of copyright law, 
enforcement has increased the gap between the social and legal perceptions 
of the law.”140 Indeed, without completely discounting deterrence effects, the 
weight of evidence in sociology and behavioral psychology suggests that 
obeying the law is more normative than instrumental.141 Tom Tyler’s 
canonical research found that whether people obey the law depends on their 
perception that the law is legitimate; legitimacy in turn is influenced by 
perceptions of fairness.142 Persuading ordinary consumers who would pay for 
creative content in a world without illegal file-sharing to continue to do so in 
spite of the existence of BitTorrent means appealing to their sense of fairness 
as well as their fear of sanctions. Unreasonable and arbitrary sanctions 
undermine the normative case for copyright compliance.143 Copyright owners 
who want to reinforce their normative appeals with deterrence should 
increase the perceived probability of detection instead of pursuing million-
dollar verdicts in show trials.144 To the extent a theory of rational deterrence 
justifies large statutory damages, they must still comply with the Due Process 
clause. In BMW of North America v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that 
if punitive damages exceed compensatory damages by a ratio of more than 10 
to 1, they probably violate the constitutional guarantee of Due Process.145 
Later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court 
noted that “four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close 
to the line of constitutional impropriety.”146 It is not clear that the Court’s 
guidance should extend to every context,147 but it does suggest that even 
without legislative reform, district court judges have a duty to ensure that 
statutory damages do not exceed the proportionality constraints of the Due 
Process clause. In addition to the general duty to uphold the Constitution, 
the Copyright Act clearly states that any award should be what the court 
“considers just.”148 
 
 139.  Id. at 1256. 
 140.  Id. at 1252. 
 141.  Id. at 1267–68. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 142.  TYLER, supra note 141, at 25. 
 143.  Cf. Depoorter et al., supra note 138, at 1268–69. 
 144.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, 593 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321–22 (D. Mass. 2009); 
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 145.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 146.  Id. at 425 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991); BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996)). 
 147.  Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that the need for deterrence may require damages in excess of the State Farm formula). 
 148.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012). 
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The statutory damages available in ordinary file-sharing cases should be 
reduced by Congress or circumscribed by the courts. Obviously, selecting any 
particular number may appear arbitrary, but we can at least move toward a 
rational basis for statutory damages by comparing file sharing to other often-
undetected violations. My specific proposal is that the constitutionally 
plausible range of statutory damages for a first-time defendant found liable 
for illegal file-sharing should be between $250 and $3000. The lower 
boundary is equivalent to the fine for parking in a handicapped space.149 The 
upper boundary is in the ballpark of fines imposed for driving under the 
influence.150 According to the Centers for Disease Control, “almost 30 people 
in the United States die in motor vehicle crashes that involve an alcohol-
impaired driver” every day, and “[t]he annual cost of alcohol-related crashes 
totals more than $51 billion.”151 There are no reported incidents of death by 
file-sharing. This range should not be exceeded even for multiple acts of 
infringement unless the plaintiff can establish that damages beyond the range 
are necessary for either compensation or deterrence.152 
Limiting the statutory damages available in Internet file-sharing cases 
would not impair general deterrence campaigns like those of the RIAA.153 The 
prospect of nontrivial sanctions combined with an award of attorney’s fees will 
encourage accused infringers who are in fact liable to admit their wrongdoing 
and settle quickly. But the amounts at stake are not so great that no reasonable 
person could ever be expected to defend themselves against an erroneous 
accusation. Moreover, intermediaries that are currently in the business of 
monetizing infringements on a low-penalty/high-volume basis would not be 
greatly affected by a lower range of statutory damages. For example 
Rightscorp (aka DigitalRights Corp) and another company, CEG TEK, offer 
alleged infringers the chance to settle claims of copyright infringement for as 
 
 149.  Vehicles parked in a space reserved for persons with disabilities without properly 
displaying disability license plates or a parking placard may be fined a minimum of $250. 625 
ILL. COMP. STAT 5/11-1301.3 (2014). 
 150.  In lieu of more systematic data is a recent example: a Chicago local television news 
reporter pled guilty in February 2014 to driving under the influence and was ordered to pay a 
$1700 fine with one year’s supervision. “[P]rosecutors dropped all other charges, including 
battery, leaving the scene of an accident and child endangerment.” The reporter’s drunk-driving 
was detected after a minor traffic accident in a Taco Bell parking lot. Clifford Ward, CBS 2 Reporter 
Savini Pleads Guilty to DUI, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/suburbs/naperville-lisle/chi-savini-case-could-be-resolved-tuesday-20140203-story.html. 
 151. Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html (last updated 
Oct. 7, 2014). 
 152.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 56, at 509–10 (recommending that “[c]ourts 
should also have the power to lower statutory damages below the . . . minimum when an award 
based on this minimum would be grossly disproportionate to the harm caused”). 
 153.  See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
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little as $20 per infraction.154 These settlement offers are communicated by 
DMCA takedown notices which the ISP is obliged to pass on to the relevant 
account holder.155 The emphasis in these notices is the opportunity for the 
alleged file-sharer to settle inexpensively and quickly. These companies now 
send out tens of millions of these notices on behalf of copyright owners in the 
United States alone.156 
Reforming statutory damages would allow copyright owners to continue 
to litigate to deter infringement and steer consumers toward the legitimate 
market, but it would keep litigation from being an independent revenue 
stream. 
This is not just an economic reform; it will also protect the integrity of 
the judicial system. Currently, the prospect of high statutory damages 
unrelated to any assessment of harm sounds like easy money. There may be 
upstanding plaintiffs and lawyers pursuing MDJD lawsuits as a revenue stream, 
but there is substantial evidence that the easy money of statutory damages has 
attracted those with dubious ethics and a propensity for cutting corners.157 
The threat of massive statutory damages gives plaintiffs and their attorneys 
enormous leverage with no accountability in John Doe file sharing litigation. 
Modern copyright law has invited blackmail and abuse of process by divorcing 
statutory damages from compensation and deterrence; that invitation has 
been eagerly accepted by some and it should be revoked.158 
 
 154.  See Sample Settlement, RIGHTSCORP, http://www.rightscorp.com/enforcement/sample-
settlement-agreement (last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
 155. See generally Ernesto, Anti-Piracy Firm Wants to Fine Aussie and Canadian File-Sharers, 
TORRENTFREAK (July 18, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/anti-piracy-firm-wants-fine-aussie-
canadian-file-sharers-140718/. 
 156.  According to a recent press release, Rightscorp has “received settlements from subscribers 
of more than 140 ISPs and closed over 75,000 cases of copyright infringement to date.” Rightscorp’s 
Copyright Monetization Service Increases Representation of ‘Billboard’ Hot 100 Songs, RIGHTSCORP (July 31, 
2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rightscorps-copyright-monetization-
service-increases-representation-of-billboard-hot-100-songs-269354671.html. 
 157.  See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 82 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 
979 (D. Nev. 2011) (ordering Righthaven to show cause “why it should not be sanctioned for [] 
flagrant misrepresentation[s] to the Court”). 
 158.  Plaintiff Voltage Pictures, LLC has also filed multiple-defendant cases in at least one 
state court under a theory of trademark infringement. The relevant cause of action does not allow 
for statutory damages, but there would be nothing to prevent Voltage from threatening the 
account holders of the IP addresses it seeks to discover with statutory damages under copyright 
once it learns their identities. See, e.g., Voltage Pictures, LLC, v. Doe No. 1, Nos. 6:14-cv-812-MC, 
6:14-cv-816-MC, 2014 WL 2830845, at *1 (D. Or. June 20, 2014) (holding state law claim was 
preempted by copyright law). 
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2. Denying Joinder, Severing Cases 
A second option is to deny joinder (sever cases) as many courts have 
done.159 Denying joinder increases the plaintiff’s enforcement cost: it adds a 
$350 filing fee for each defendant, and it demands substantially more court 
time from the plaintiff’s lawyers. If courts force disfavored plaintiffs to endure 
greater expense because they doubt the social value of the copyright work, 
they abuse their discretion.160 But refusing to allow plaintiffs to circumvent 
filing fees is legitimate. Filing fees are “a threshold barrier, albeit a modest 
one, against the filing of frivolous or otherwise meritless lawsuits.”161 
Requiring individual filings, and thus filing fees, in BitTorrent infringement 
cases would destroy the financial appeal of litigation as a revenue source, but 
it would still leave the courthouse open for litigation aimed at general 
deterrence or example setting. Because joinder makes abusive litigation 
tactics more likely, courts should use their discretion to curb such potential 
abuse. Disallowing joinder in MDJD cases would help ensure that litigation is 
used to protect the plaintiff’s copyrights and not simply to monetize 
infringement.162  
 
Figure 5. Individual Doe Defendants in John Doe Copyright Cases, 
 2001–2014 
 
 159.  See supra note 78 (citing examples of cases concluding joinder is impermissible or 
inappropriate). 
 160.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges 
of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
 161.  Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–38, 941 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D. Mass. 2013) (quoting 
Third Degree Films v. Does 1–47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 198 (D. Mass. 2012)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 162.  Id. (“Furthermore, it will help to ensure that Patrick Collins is pursuing the Doe 
defendants for the purpose of protecting its intellectual property and not simply to coerce early 
settlements without any intention of litigating its claims to completion.”). 
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Although many courts allowed plaintiffs to join thousands of defendants 
in a single action, my data shows increasing judicial resistance. Figure 5, 
above, shows a conservative estimate of the number of Doe defendants in 
these cases.163 As shown in Figure 5, the number of individual defendants 
peaked in 2010 and has declined since. Although pornography related suits 
have accounted for an increased number of filings over the past four years, 
the raw numbers of John Doe defendants in pornography related suits has 
declined since 2011. Although the data does not definitively establish this, it 
does suggest that, in response to this mounting judicial skepticism, plaintiffs 
are suing fewer defendants in each MDJD suit to make joinder more 
palatable.164 
The opportunism associated with the current wave of MDJD suits is not 
confined to this format. Lawyers have reported that some plaintiffs have now 
abandoned the MDJD form for BitTorrent litigation and are now suing 
individual IP addresses and demanding significantly higher settlement 
amounts. The most significant actor in this field, Malibu Media, LLC only filed 
suits against single IP addresses in the first six months of 2014, demanding 
higher settlement amounts to compensate for its increased costs. Malibu 
Media filed nearly 2000 such cases from January 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. 
Lawyers report that Malibu Media has increased its settlement demand for 
these cases. 
Figure 6 illustrates the average number of John Doe defendants per suit 
filed on a year-by-year basis. The individual bowls in Figure 6 are scaled to 
reflect the total number of John Doe defendants in a given year. As illustrated, 
2010 saw an extraordinary number of defendants, 41,025 to be exact, 
targeted in a mere 91 suits. In the following year 43,632 defendants were 
targeted, but these John Does were spread out over 435 individual suits. The 
total number of John Doe defendants fell in 2012 and again in 2013 to 30,666 
and 22,239 respectively, even as the number of lawsuits filed increased from 
1211 to 1640. Thus, although the average number of defendants per suit has 
decreased precipitously since 2010, there has been a steady increase in filings. 
We should not expect this litigation environment to remain static. Malibu 
Media, now the most prolific litigator in this area, has adapted its strategy and 
no longer relies on joinder at all. 
 
  
 
 163.  As noted previously, the methodology of counting John Doe defendants relies on the case 
captions themselves; it is likely to be underinclusive. See supra Tables 1 & 2 and accompanying text. 
 164.  Note that the number of Doe defendants in each case is calculated based on the case 
title. This data will be supplemented with additional research into cases titled “[Copyright 
Owner] v. Does” in the near future. As a result the numbers reported herein will increase. 
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Figure 6. Average Number of Doe Defendants per Suit, 2001–2013 
 
One explanation of the decline in John Does per suit relates to personal 
jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(2) permits dismissal of a claim based on lack of 
personal jurisdiction.165 Residency, minimum contacts, or purposeful 
availment under most state laws establishes personal jurisdiction.166 
Defendants are in a Catch-22. They do not want to be named individually, but 
until they are, some courts will not grant a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.167 Nonetheless, as courts have grown more skeptical of 
 
 165.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). 
 166.  See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Due 
Process requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum, 
thereby ensuring “that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. at 297. 
 167.  See, e.g., First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1–500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 251 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(“Defendants cannot be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) from a lawsuit 
to which they are not yet parties.”); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–6, 291 F.R.D. 191, 206 
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (noting that because Putative Defendants are not yet parties to the suit, their 
argument that the court lacks personal jurisdiction is premature); First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 
1–76, 276 F.R.D. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Defendants arguments are once again premature.”); 
MGCIP v. Does 1–316, No. 10 C 6677, 2011 WL 2292958, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2011) 
(“[P]utative defendants’s [sic] motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are [] 
premature at this stage of the litigation.”). For further discussion, see, for example, London-Sire 
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180–81 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting “[i]t would be 
premature to adjudicate personal jurisdiction” and permitting plaintiff to engage in jurisdictional 
discovery); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(evaluating personal jurisdiction premature without defendants’ identifying information). But see 
DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does 1–240, No. 10 Civ. 8760(PAC), 2011 WL 4444666, at *3 & n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (dismissing the complaint because of insufficient allegations of 
personal jurisdiction but noting that allegations were also insufficient to satisfy joinder 
requirements). 
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these MDJD suits, plaintiffs have had to work harder to establish a credible 
basis for pleading personal jurisdiction. 
Severing cases would be inefficient if it required multiple judges to 
adjudicate the same issues, over and over again, for the exact same plaintiffs. 
But there is no reason why cases could not be severed and then consolidated. 
The basis of consolidation could be (i) the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff law firm; 
or even (iii) the plaintiff’s technical experts who log the IP addresses to begin 
with. Consolidation could be for limited purposes including (1) assessing the 
validity and ownership of the copyrights; (2) determining the reliability of 
plaintiff’s proffered expert; and (3) entertaining affirmative defenses that are 
potentially applicable in all cases. The “it wasn’t me” defenses should then 
proceed on an unconsolidated basis. 
3. Conditional Joinder and Other Safeguards 
Forcing the plaintiff to proceed on an individual basis is not the only 
possible solution. District court judges have inherent power to supervise 
litigation and substantial discretion in joinder and discovery. Even in the 
absence of legislative reform, district courts could use their considerable 
powers to impose safeguards on the discovery process and constrain the 
potential for abuse. Specifically: 
(i) Joinder in MDJD actions should be unavailable unless the 
plaintiff does not seek or threaten to seek statutory damages above a 
specified amount. For the reasons stated in the previous section, that 
range, at least for a first-time defendant, should be between $250 
and $3000.168 
(ii) The court could appoint an independent attorney to supervise 
the discovery process and ensure that the names and addresses of 
individuals are not given to the plaintiff until the initial round of “it 
wasn’t me defenses” have been raised and investigated. This will 
bring to light any systematic errors by ISPs (or by the plaintiff) in 
identifying IP addresses or matching IP addresses to subscribers. 
(iii) In the same vein, the court could provide defendants with the 
option of a mini-trial on their “it wasn’t me” defenses. 
(iv) The court could grant defendants leave to proceed anonymously 
to protect their privacy, at least until liability has been definitively 
established.169 
 
 168.  See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 169.  TCYK, LLC v. Does 1–62, No. 13 C 3842, 2013 WL6671675, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 
2013) (“Numerous courts have deemed it prudent to allow defendants to proceed by pseudonym 
during preliminary stages of copyright infringement proceedings, even when, as here, the 
material downloaded is innocuous, given the ‘substantial possibility that the names turned over 
by ISPs will not accurately identify the individuals who actually downloaded or shared the 
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These reforms and similar safeguards could reduce the threat of abusive 
litigation tactics while retaining the initial efficiency of the MDJD format. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although patent trolls have drawn more attention, there is an explosion 
of copyright trolling in U.S. federal district courts. The data in this Article 
shows that copyright trolling in the form of John Doe lawsuits has grown 
rapidly over the last decade and that much of the growth has taken place in 
the last four years. The data also shows that John Doe litigation is dominated 
by claims of infringement relating to pornographic films. Highlighting these 
particular trends and their implications, this study has significant implications 
for the wider troll debate. This Article shows that previous studies have missed 
the core of the copyright troll phenomenon.170 
The opportunism of copyright trolls is primarily directed towards 
statutory damages. As the Righthaven example shows, statutory damages can 
make the pursuit of otherwise inconsequential infringements extremely 
profitable—more than licensing those uses in advance could ever have been. 
As the John Doe cases show, statutory damages stack such that the defendant’s 
liability is effectively irrelevant to the settlement calculation. 
The policy implications of John Doe litigation need to be carefully 
considered. One of the core problems with this type of litigation is the lack of 
due process. Once identified, rightly or wrongly, the rational defendant will 
settle in almost every case because of the threat of statutory damages and the 
difficulty of disproving infringement. Statutory damages and the settlements 
procured in the shadow of statutory damages are arbitrary and 
disproportionate to the underlying offense. 
But these John Doe lawsuits are not invariably, or even primarily, 
frivolous. Mostly, the plaintiffs are the rights owners of copyrighted works that 
have been downloaded without permission in clear violation of the Copyright 
Act. In the aggregate this illegal downloading harms copyright owners and 
reduces their incentives to produce creative works, but avoiding this harm or 
being compensated for it has nothing to do with the current wave of John Doe 
litigation. These cases are about monetizing infringement over and above 
deterrence and compensation. Monetizing infringement is perfectly legal, but 
it is hard to square with the motivating purpose of copyright law: promoting 
social progress.171  
 
copyrighted material.’” (quoting TCYK, LLC v. Does 1–87, No. 13 C 3845, 2013 WL 3465186, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2013)). 
 170.  See generally Balganesh, supra note 23. One previous study focused on the application of 
fair use where copyright trolls attempt to exploit previously tolerated uses. See generally Brad A. 
Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2014). Another 
argued that an independent market for copyright claims could be beneficial. See generally 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277 (2013). 
 171.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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APPENDIX A: COPYRIGHT LAWSUITS FILED IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS: 
 2001–2014 
 
 
APPENDIX B: COPYRIGHT SUITS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS:  
2001 TO JUNE 30, 2014 
 
The table below is current to June 30, 2014. The top section of the table 
shows how many cases were filed under the 820 code for Copyright in U.S. 
Federal District Courts in the years 2003 to 2014. The bottom section of the 
table translates the same information into percentages. The “Copyright-All” 
category includes all copyright cases. “Copyright-John Doe” includes all 
copyright cases where the defendant was a John Doe, without differentiating 
as to the underlying subject matter of the compliant. “Copyright-John Doe 
(Porn)” is a subset of the previous category and includes all cases identified 
as relating to pornography. The final category, “Malibu Media v. Doe(s)” 
includes every case filed by Malibu Media against one or more John Does. 
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